The probabilistic serial (PS) rule is one of the most prominent randomized rules for the assignment problem. It is well-known for its superior fairness and welfare properties. However, PS is not immune to manipulative behaviour by the agents. We examine computational and non-computational aspects of strategising under the PS rule. Firstly, we study the computational complexity of an agent manipulating the PS rule. We present polynomial-time algorithms for optimal manipulation. Secondly, we show that expected utility best responses can cycle. Thirdly, we examine the existence and computation of Nash equilibrium profiles under the PS rule. We show that a pure Nash equilibrium is guaranteed to exist under the PS rule. For two agents, we identify two different types of preference profiles that are not only in Nash equilibrium but can also be computed in linear time. Finally, we conduct experiments to check the frequency of manipulability of the PS rule under different combinations of the number of agents, objects, and utility functions.
INTRODUCTION
The assignment problem is one of the most fundamental and important problems in economics and computer science [see e.g., Bogomolnaia and Moulin 2001; Gärdenfors 1973; Hylland and Zeckhauser 1979; Aziz et al. 2013b; Saban and Sethuraman 2013a] . Agents express preferences over objects and, based on these preferences, the objects are allocated to the agents. A randomized or fractional assignment rule takes the preferences of the agents into account in order to allocate each agent a fraction of the object. If the objects are indivisible, the fraction can also be interpreted as the probability of receiving the object. Randomization is widespread in resource allocation since it is one of the most natural ways to ensure procedural fairness [Budish et al. 2013] . Randomized assignments have been used to assign public land, radio spectra to broadcasting companies, and US permanent visas to applicants [Footnote 1 in Budish et al. 2013] .
Typical criteria for randomized assignment being desirable are fairness and welfare. The probabilistic serial (PS) rule is an ordinal randomized/fractional assignment rule that fares better on both counts than any other random assignment rule [Bogomolnaia and Heo 2012; Bogomolnaia and Moulin 2001; Budish et al. 2013; Katta and Sethuraman 2006; Kojima 2009; Yilmaz 2010; Saban and Sethuraman 2013b] . In particular, it satisfies strong envy-freeness and efficiency with respect to both stochastic dominance (SD) and downward lexicographic (DL) relations [Bogomolnaia and Moulin 2001; Schulman and Vazirani 2012; Kojima 2009] . SD is one of the most fundamental relations between fractional allocations because one allocation is SD-preferred over another iff for any utility representation consistent with the ordinal preferences, the former yields at least as much expected utility as the latter. DL is a refinement of SD and based on lexicographic comparisons between fractional allocations. Generalizations of the PS rule have been recommended in many settings [see e.g., Budish et al. 2013] . The PS rule also satisfies some desirable incentive properties. If the number of objects is not more than the number of agents, then PS is weak strategyproof with respect to stochastic dominance [Bogomolnaia and Moulin 2001] . However, PS is not immune from manipulation. 1 PS works as follows. Each agent expresses linear orders over the set of houses (we use the term house throughout the paper though we stress any object could be allocated with these mechanisms). Each house is considered to have a divisible probability weight of one, and agents simultaneously and with the same speed consume the probability weight of their most preferred house. Once a house has been consumed, the agent proceeds to eat the next most preferred house that has not been completely consumed. The procedure terminates after all the houses have been consumed. The random allocation of an agent by PS is the amount of each object he has eaten. 2 We examine the following natural questions for the first time: what is the computational complexity of an agent computing a different preference to report so as to get a better PS outcome? How often is a preference profile manipulable under the PS rule?. 3 The complexity of manipulation of the PS rule has bearing on another issue that has recently been studied-preference profiles that are in Nash equilibrium. Ekici and Kesten [2012] showed that when agents are not truthful, the outcome of PS may not satisfy desirable properties related to efficiency and envy-freeness. Because the PS rule is manipulable it is important to understand how hard, computationally, it is for an agent to compute a beneficial misreporting as this may make it difficult in practice to exploit the mechanism. It is also interesting to identify preference profiles for which no agent has an incentive to unilaterally deviate to gain utility with respect to his actual preferences. Hence, we consider the following problem: for a preference profile, does a (pure) Nash equilibrium exist or not and if it exists how efficiently can it be computed?
In order to compare random allocations, an agent needs to consider relations between random allocation. We consider three well-known relations between lotteries [see e.g., Bogomolnaia and Moulin 2001; Schulman and Vazirani 2012; Saban and Sethuraman 2013b; Cho 2012] : (i) expected utility (EU), (ii) stochastic dominance (SD), and (iii) downward lexicographic (DL). For EU, an agent seeks a different allocation that yields more expected utility. For SD, an agent seeks a different allocation that yields more expected utility for all cardinal utilities consistent with the ordinal preferences. For DL, an agent seeks an allocation that gives a higher probability to the most preferred alternative that has different probabilities in the two allocations. Throughout the paper, we assume that agents express strict preferences, i.e., they are not indifferent between any two houses.
Contributions. We initiate the study of computing best responses and checking for Nash equilibrium for the PS mechanism -one of the most established randomized rules for the assignment problem. We present a polynomial-time algorithm to compute the DL best response for multiple agents and houses. The algorithm works by carefully simulating the PS rule for a sequence of partial preference lists. For the case of two agents 4 , we present a polynomial-time algorithm to compute an EU best response for any utilities consistent with the ordinal preferences. The result for the EU best response relies on an interesting connection between the PS rule and the sequential allocation rule for discrete objects. We leave open the problem of computing the expected utility response for arbitrary number of agents. The fact that a similar problem has also remained open for sequential allocation [Bouveret and Lang 2011] gives some indication of the challenge of the problem.
We then examine situations in which all agents are strategic. We first show that expected utility best responses can cycle. Nash dynamics in matching theory has been active area of research especially for the stable matching problem [see e.g., Ackermann et al. 2011] . We then prove that a (pure) Nash equilibrium exists for any number of agents and houses. To the best of our knowledge, this is the first proof of the existence of a Nash equilibrium for the PS rule. For the case of two agents we present two different linear-time algorithms to compute a preference profile that is in Nash equilibrium with respect to the original preferences. One type of equilibrium profile results in the same assignment as the one by original profile.
Finally, we perform an experimental study of the frequency of manipulability of the PS mechanism. We investigate, under a variety of utility functions and preference distributions, the likelihood that some agent in a profile has an incentive to misreport his preference. The experiments identify settings and utility models in which PS is less susceptible to manipulation.
PRELIMINARIES
An assignment problem (N, H, ) consists of a set of agents N = {1, . . . , n}, a set of houses H = {h 1 , . . . , h m } and a preference profile = ( 1 , . . . , n ) in which i denotes a complete, transitive and strict ordering on H representing the preferences of agent i over the houses in H. Since each i will be strict throughout the paper, we will also refer to it simply as i .
A fractional assignment is a (n × m) matrix [p(i)(j)] such that for all i ∈ N , and h j ∈ H, 0 ≤ p(i)(j) ≤ 1; and for all j ∈ {1, . . . , n}, i∈N p(i)(j) = 1 The value p(i)(j) is the fraction of house h j that agent i gets. Each row p(i) = (p(i)(1), . . . , p(i)(m)) represents the allocation of agent i. A fractional assignment can also be interpreted as a random assignment where p(i)(j) is the probability of agent i getting house h j . We will also denote p(i)(j) by p(i)(h j ).
Relations between random allocations. A standard method to compare lotteries is to use the SD (stochastic dominance) relation. Given two random assignments p and q, p(i)
Given two random assignments p and q, p(i)
When agents are considered to have cardinal utilities for the objects, we denote by u i (h) the utility that agent i gets from house h. We will assume that total utility of an agent equals the sum of the utilities that he gets from each of the houses. Given two random assignments p and q, p(i)
Since for all i ∈ N , agent i compares assignment p with assignment q only with respect to his allocations p(i) and q(i), we will sometimes abuse the notation and use p SD i q for p(i) SD i q(i). A random assignment rule takes as input an assignment problem (N, H, ) and returns a random assignment which specifies how much fraction or probability of each house is allocated to each agent.
THE PROBABILISTIC SERIAL RULE AND ITS MANIPULATION
Recall that the Probabilistic Serial (PS) rule is a random assignment algorithm in which we consider each house as infinitely divisible. At each point in time, each agent is consuming his most preferred house that has not completely been consumed and each agent has the same unit speed. Hence all the houses are consumed at time m/n and each agent receives a total of m/n unit of houses. The probability of house h j being allocated to i is the fraction of house h j that i has eaten. The PS fractional assignment can be computed in time O(mn). We refer the reader to [Bogomolnaia and Moulin 2001] Example 3.1 (PS rule). Consider an assignment problem with the following preference profile.
1 : h 1 , h 2 , h 3 2 : h 2 , h 1 , h 3 3 : h 2 , h 3 , h 1 Agents 2 and 3 start eating h 2 simultaneously whereas agent 1 eats h 1 . When 2 and 3 finish h 2 , agent 3 has only eaten half of h 1 . The timing of the eating can be seen below. The final allocation computed by PS is P S( 1 , 2 , 3 ) = 3/4 0 1/4 1/4 1/2 1/4 0 1/2 1/2 . Consider the assignment problem in Example 3.1. If agent 1 misreports his preferences as follows: 1 : h 2 , h 1 , h 3 , then P S( 1 , 2 , 3 ) = 1/3 1/2 1/6 1/3 1/2 1/6 1/3 0 2/3 . Then, if u 1 (h 1 ) = 7, u 1 (h 2 ) = 6, and u 1 (h 3 ) = 0, then agent 1 gets more expected utility when he reports 1 . In the example, although truth-telling is a DL best response, it is not necessarily an EU best response for agent 1.
Examples 1 and 2 of [Kojima 2009] show that manipulating the PS mechanism can lead to an SD improvement when each agent can be allocated more than one house. In light of the fact that the PS rule can be manipulated, we examine the complexity of a single agent computing a manipulation, in other words, the best response for the PS rule. 5 We then study the existence and computation of Nash equilibria. For E ∈ {SD, EU, DL}, we define the problem EBESTRESPONSE: given (N, H, ) and agent i ∈ N , compute a preference i for agent i such that there exists no preference i such that P S(N, H,
. For a constant m, the problem EBESTRESPONSE can can be solved by brute force by trying out each of the m! preferences. Hence we won't assume that m is a constant.
We establish some more notation and terminology for the rest of the paper. We will often refer to the PS outcomes for partial lists of houses and preferences. We will denote by P S( L i , −i )(i), the allocation that agent i receives when his preferences are restricted to the list L where L is an ordered list of a subset of houses. When an agent runs out of houses in his preference list, he does not eat any other houses. The length of a list L is denoted |L|, and we refer to the kth house in L as L(k). In the PS rule, the eating start time of a house is the time point at which the house starts to be eaten by some agent. In Example 3.1, the eating start times of h 1 , h 2 and h 3 are 0, 0 and 0.5, respectively.
LEXICOGRAPHIC BEST RESPONSE
In this section, we present a polynomial-time algorithm for DLBESTRESPONSE. Lexicographic preferences are well-established in the assignment literature [see e.g., Saban and Sethuraman 2013b; Schulman and Vazirani 2012; Cho 2012] . Let (N, H, ) be an assignment problem where N = {1, . . . , n} and H = {h 1 , . . . , h m }. We will show how to compute a DL best response for agent 1 ∈ N . It has been shown that when m ≤ n, then truth-telling is the DL best response but if m > n, then this need not be the case [Saban and Sethuraman 2013b; Schulman and Vazirani 2012; Kojima 2009] .
Recall that a preference 1 is a DL best response for agent 1 if the fractional allocation agent 1 receives by reporting 1 is DL preferred to any fractional allocation agent 1 receives by reporting another preference. That is, there is no preference 1 such that his share of a house h when reporting 1 is strictly larger than when reporting 1 while the share of all houses he prefers to h (according to his true preference 1 ) is the same whether reporting 1 or 1 .
Our algorithm will iteratively construct a partial preference list for the i most preferred houses of agent 1. Without loss of generality, denote 1 : h 1 , h 2 , . . . , h m .
For any i, 1 ≤ i ≤ m, denote H i = {h 1 , . . . , h i }. A (partial) preference of agent 1 restricted to H i is a preference over a subset of H i . Note that a preference for H i need not list all the houses in H i . For the preference of agent 1 restricted to H i , the PS rule computes an allocation where the preference of agent 1 is replaced with this preference and the preferences of all other agents remain unchanged. Recall that agent 1 can only be allocated a non-zero fraction of a house if this house is in the preference list he submits. The notions of DL best response and DL preferred fractional assignments with respect to a subset of houses H i are defined accordingly for restricted preferences of agent 1.
For a house h ∈ H, let P S1(L, h) denote the fraction of house h that the PS rule assigns to agent 1 when he reports the (partial) preference L.
We start with a simple lemma showing that a DL best response for agent 1 for the whole set H can be no better and no worse on H i than a DL best response for H i . LEMMA 4.1. Let i ∈ {1, . . . , m}. A DL best response for agent 1 on H gives the same fractional assignment to the houses in H i as a DL best response for agent 1 on H i .
PROOF. We have that a preference for agent 1 on H i can be extended to a preference for all houses that gives the same fractional allocation to agent 1 for the houses in H i . Namely, the remaining houses H \ H i can be appended to the end of his preference list, giving the same allocation to the houses in H i as before.
On the other hand, consider a DL best response 1 for agent 1 on H, giving a fractional allocation p to agent 1. Restricting this preference to H i gives a fractional allocation q for H i . If q is DL preferred to p |Hi , i.e., the fractional allocation p restricted to H i , then q = p |Hi , otherwise we would have a contradiction to 1 being a DL best response as per the previous argument that we can extend any preference for H i to H giving the same fractional allocation to agent 1 for the houses in H i .
Our algorithm will compute a list L i such that L i ⊆ H i . 6 The list L i will be a DL best response for agent 1 with respect to H i . Suppose the algorithm has computed L i−1 . Then, when considering H i = H i−1 ∪{h i }, it needs to make sure that the new fractional allocation restricted to the houses in H i−1 remains the same (due to Lemma 4.1). For the preference to be optimal with respect to H i , the algorithm needs to maximize the fractional allocation of h i to agent 1 under the previous constraint.
Our algorithm will compute a canonical DL best response that has several additional properties.
Any DL best response for agent 1 for H i can be converted into a no-0 DL best response by removing the houses for which agent 1 obtains a fraction of 0.
Definition 4.3. For a no-0 preference L i for H i , the stingy ordering for a position j is determined by running the PS rule with the preference
for agent 1 where ⊕ denotes concatenation. It orders the houses from |Li| k=j L i (k) by increasing eating start times, and when 2 houses h, h have the same eating start time, we order h before h iff h 1 h .
Intuitively, houses occurring early in this ordering are the most threatened by the other agents at the time point when agent 1 comes to position j. The following definition takes into account that the eating start times of later houses may change depending on agent 1's ordering of earlier houses.
Definition 4.4. A preference L i for H i is stingy if it is a no-0 DL best response for agent 1 on H i , and for every j ∈ {1, . . . , i}, L i (j) is the first house in the stingy ordering for this position such that there exists a DL best response starting with
We note that, due to Lemma 4.1, there is a unique stingy preference for each H i .
Example 4.5. Consider the following assignment problem.
The preferences h 3 , h 1 , h 4 , h 2 and h 3 , h 2 , h 4 , h 1 are both no-0 DL best responses for agent 1 with respect to H 4 , allocating h 1 (1), h 2 (1), h 3 (1/2), h 4 (1/2) to agent 1. When running the PS rule with h 3 as the preference list, h 4 's eating start time comes first among {h 1 , h 2 , h 4 }. However, there is no DL best response for H 4 starting with h 3 , h 4 . The next house in the stingy ordering is h 1 . The preference h 3 , h 1 , h 4 , h 2 is the stingy preference for H 4 .
The next lemma shows that when agent 1 receives a house partially (a fraction different from 0 and 1) in a DL best response, a stingy preference would not order a less preferred house before that house. LEMMA 4.6. Let L i be a stingy preference for
PROOF. For the sake of contradiction, assume P contains a house h k such that
But then, removing the houses in K from L i gives a preference that is strictly DL preferred to L i since this increases agent 1's share of h j while only the shares of less preferred houses decrease. This contradicts L i being a DL best response for H i , and therefore proves the lemma.
The next lemma shows how the houses allocated completely to agent 1 are ordered in a stingy preference.
then either the eating start time of h j is smaller than h k 's eating start time when agent 1 reports P , or it is the same and h j 1 h k .
PROOF. Suppose not. But then, L i is not stingy since swapping h j and h k in L i gives the same fractional allocation to agent 1.
We now show that when iterating from a set of houses H i−1 to H i , the previous solution can be reused up to the last house that agent 1 receives partially.
LEMMA 4.8. Let L i−1 and L i be stingy preferences for H i−1 and H i , respectively. Suppose there is a h ∈ H i−1 such that 0 < P S1(L i−1 , h) < 1. Then the prefixes of L i−1 and L i coincide up to h.
, then since at least one other agent eats x i−1 concurrently with agent 1 when he reports L i−1 , he loses a non-zero fraction of x i−1 when instead he reports L i and eats x i after having exhausted P i , we have that P S1(L i , x i−1 ) < P S1(L i−1 , x i−1 ), a contradiction to Lemma 4.1. Similarly, we obtain a contradiction when P S1(L i , x i ) < 1. Therefore, P S1(L i−1 , x i−1 ) = P S1(L i , x i ) = 1. Now, by Lemma 4.1, we also have that P S1(L i−1 , x i−1 ) = P S1(L i , x i ) = 1. But only one of x i , x i−1 can come earlier in the stingy ordering. The other one contradicts Lemma 4.7.
We are now ready to describe how to obtain L i from L i−1 . See Algorithm 1 for the pseudocode. The subroutine EST(N, H, ) executes the PS rule for (N, H, ) and for each item, records the first time point where some agent starts eating it. It returns the eating start times est(h) for each house h ∈ H.
Let p be the last position in L i−1 such that the house L i−1 (p) is partially allocated to agent 1. In case agent 1 receives no house partially, set p := 0 and interpret L i−1 (p) as an imaginary house before the first house of L i−1 . By Lemma 4.8, we have that
By Lemma 4.1, we have that the fractional assignment resulting from L i must wholly allocate all houses L i−1 (p + 1), . . . , L i−1 (|L i−1 |) to agent 1, and allocate a share of 0 to all houses in
It remains to find the right ordering for {L i−1 (s) : p + 1 ≤ s ≤ |L i−1 |} ∪ {h i }. By Lemmas 4.6 and 4.7, the prefixes of L i−1 and L i coincide up to h. We will describe in the next paragraph how to determine the position q where h i should be inserted. Having determined this position one may then need to re-order the subsequent houses. This is because inserting h i in the list may change the eating start times of the subsequent
Complete the list according to the stingy ordering 10
44 end for 45 return Ln
Algorithm 1: DL best response for n agents houses. This leads us to the following insertion procedure. The list L q i obtained from
in the stingy ordering for this position. After the while-loop terminates, run the PS rule for the resulting list L q i . In case we obtain that P S1(L , then increment q. This is because, by Lemma 4.1, this preference would not be a DL best response with respect to
. This position for h i is optimal since moving h i later in the list would decrease its share to agent 1. Otherwise, we have that worse[q] = false and P S1(L q i , h i ) ∈ {0, 1}. This will be the share agent 1 receives of
, it still remains to check whether the current position for h i gives a stingy preference. For this, run the PS rule with the preference
Thus, given L i−1 , the preference L i can be computed by executing the PS rule O(m) times. The DL best response computed by the algorithm is L m . Since the PS rule can be implemented to run in linear time O(nm), the running time of this DL best response algorithm is O(nm 3 ).
THEOREM 4.9. DLBESTRESPONSE can be solved in O(nm 3 ) time.
Example 4.10. Consider the following instance.
Note that h 1 and h 2 have been swapped with respect to L 2 since agent 2 starts eating h 2 before agent 3 starts eating h 1 when agent 1 reports the preference list consisting of only h 3 . It turns out that P S1(L
Since h 3 does not come first in the stingy ordering, the algorithm needs to verify whether moving h 3 later will still give a DL best response with respect to H 3 . It then considers L 2 3 = h 1 , h 3 , h 2 . However, this allocates only half of h 3 to agent 1, implying worse[2] = true. Since worse[1] = false, the algorithm sets L 3 = L 1 3 . The DL best response computed by the algorithm is L 10 = h 3 , h 2 , h 1 , h 6 . Example 4.11. Figure 1 depicts how the DL best response of agent 1 looks like. After h 1 is inserted, the starting eating time h 3 is before h 4 . But after h 2 is inserted in to form L 2 , then the starting eating time of h 4 comes before h 3 because agent 2 won't be able to eat h 2 . After h 4 is inserted to build L 4 , it turns out that agent 2 will not be able to eat h 4 at all. That is why h 2 is shaded in the eating line of agent 2 because it will already be eaten by the time agent 2 considers eating it at time 10/3.
The DL optimal best response algorithm carefully builds up the DL optimal preferences list while ensuring it is stingy.
We note that a DL best response is also an SD best response. A best response was defined as a response that is not dominated. Hence a DL-best response is one which no other response DL-dominates. This means that no other response SD-dominates (as DL is a refinement of SD) it. Hence, a DL best response is also a SD best response. One may wonder whether an algorithm to compute the DL best response also provides us with an algorithm to compute an EU best response. However, a DL best response may not be an EU best response for three or more agents. Consider the preference profile in Example 3.1. Since the number of houses is equal to the number of agents, reporting the truthful preference is a DL best response [Schulman and Vazirani 2012] . However, we have shown a different preference for agent 1 where he may obtain higher utility.
EXPECTED UTILITY BEST RESPONSE
In this section we present an algorithm to compute an EU best response for two agents for the PS rule. First, we reveal a tight connection between a well-known mechanism for sequential allocation of indivisible houses and the PS mechanism (Section 5.1). Then we demonstrate how the expected utility best response algorithm for the sequential allocation of indivisible houses proposed by Kohler and Chandrasekaran [1971] can be used to build a best response for the PS algorithm (Section 5.2).
A connection between allocation mechanisms for divisible and indivisible houses
We can obtain the same allocation given by the PS algorithm using the alternation policy, which is a simple mechanism for dividing discrete houses between agents. The alternating policy lets the agents take turns in picking the house that they value most: the first agent takes his most preferred house, then the second agent takes his most preferred house from the remaining houses, and so on. We use the notation 1212 . . . to denote the alternation policy. To obtain the allocation of the PS algorithm using the alternation policy we split our houses into halves and treat them as indivisible houses and adjust agents' preferences over these halves in a natural way.
Recall that H = {h 1 , . . . , h m } is the set of houses. Assume 2 : h 1 , . . . , h m and the preference of agent 1 is a permutation of h 1 , . . . , h m as follows 1 : h π(1) , . . . , h π(m) . We denote i (k) the kth preferred house of the agent i, and by
We split each house h i , i = 1, . . . , m, into halves and treat these halves as indivisible houses. Given h i , we say that h that are obtained from 1 and 2 using the order-preserving bisection, respectively, have the consecutivity property.
Next, we define the order-preserving join operation. It is the reverse operation for the order-preserving bisection. Given a preference CLONED s of the order-preserving join operation merges all halve houses that are ordered consecutively into a single house and leaves the other houses unchanged. Applying the order-preserving join to If the most preferred houses of the two agents are different, say the most preferred house among the remaining houses of agent 1 is h j , and the most preferred of agent 2 is h k , then agent 1 completely receives house h j and agent 2 completely receives house h k in step i of the PS rule. In the alternation policy, agent 1 gets h .
Computing an EU best response
In this section we present an algorithm to compute an expected utility best response for the PS mechanism. First, we recap our settings. We are given two agents 1 and 2 with profiles 1 and 2 , respectively, over houses in H. We assume that agent 1 plays strategically and agent 2 plays truthfully. The goal is to find an expected utility best response for agent 1 for the PS rule. To do so, we reuse an EU best response for the alternation policy over split houses, that does not have the consecutivity property (we provide such an example in the full report). However, we show in Algorithm 2 that we can always find another expected utility best response CLONED-BEST 1 that has the consecutivity property. We need to delay the allocation of some half-houses that agent 1 gets. The modifications of the best response CLONED-BEST 1 in lines 3-12 produce another best response that has the consecutivity property for agent 1. A detailed description of the algorithm from [Kohler and Chandrasekaran 1971] and a proof of correctness of Algorithm 2 can be found in the full report.
Remark 5.5. The EU best response algorithm is independent of particular utilities and holds for any utilities consistent with the ordinal preferences. Since PS for two agents only involves fractions 0, 1 2 , and 1, a DL best response is also equivalent to an EU best response. Hence we have proved that the DL best response algorithm in Section 4 is also an EU best response algorithm for the case of two agents.
NASH DYNAMICS AND EQUILIBRIUM
In contrast to the previous sections where a single agent is strategic, we consider the setting when all the agents are strategic. We first prove that for expected utility best Technical Report: January 2014. responses, the preference profile of the agents can cycle when agents have Borda utilities. This means that it is possible that self interested agents, acting unilaterally, may never stop reacting. THEOREM 6.1. With 3 agents and 6 items where agents have Borda utilities, a series of expected utility best responses by the agents can lead to a cycle in the profile.
Using a computer program we have found a sequence of best response that cycle. Checking the existence of a preference profile that is in Nash equilibrium appears to be a challenging problem. The naive way of checking existence of Nash equilibrium requires going through O(m! n ) profiles, which is super-polynomial even when n = O(1) or m = O(1). Although computing a Nash equilibrium is a challenging problem, we show that at least one (pure) Nash equilibrium is guaranteed to exist for any number of houses, any number of agents, and any preference relation over fractional allocations.
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The proof relies on showing that the PS rule can be modelled as a perfect information extensive form game. THEOREM 6.2. A pure Nash equilibrium is guaranteed to exist under the PS rule for any number of agents and houses, and for any relation between allocations.
PROOF SKETCH. Let t 0 , . . . , t k be the k + 1 different time steps in the PS algorithm. Let g = GCD({t i+1 − t i : i ∈ {0, . . . , k − 1}}) where GCD denotes the greatest common divisor. The time interval length g is small enough such that the PS rule can be considered to have m/g stages of duration g. Each stage can be viewed as having n sub-stages so that in each stage, agent i eats g units of a house in sub-stage i of a stage. In each sub-stage only one agent eats g units of the most favoured house that is available. Hence we now view PS as consisting of a total of mn/g sub-stages and the agents keep coming in order 1, 2, . . . , n to eat g units of the most preferred house that is still available. If an agent ate g units of a house in a previous sub-stage then it will eat g units of the same house in the next sub-stage as long as the house has not been fully eaten. Consider a perfect information extensive form game tree. For a fixed reported preference profile, the PS rule unravels accordingly along a path starting at the root and ending at a leaf. Each level of the tree represents a sub-stage in which a certain agent has his turn to eat g units of his most preferred available house. Note that there is a one-to-one correspondence between the paths in the tree and the ways the PS algorithm can be implemented, depending on the reported preference.
A subgame perfect Nash equilibrium is guaranteed to exist for such a game via backward induction: starting from the leaves and moving towards the root of the tree, the agent at the specific node chooses an action that maximizes his utility given the actions determined for the children of the node. The subgame perfect Nash equilibrium identifies at least one such path from a leaf to the root of the game. The path can be used to read out the most preferred house of each agent at each point. The information provided is sufficient to construct a preference profile that is in Nash equilibrium. Those houses that an agent did not eat at all can conveniently be placed at the end of the preference list. Such a preference profile is in Nash equilibrium. Hence, a pure Nash equilibrium exists under the PS rule.
We also know that DL-Nash equilibrium is an SD-Nash equilibrium because if there is an SD deviation, then it is also a DL deviation. Our argument for the existence of a Nash equilibrium is constructive. However, naively constructing the extensive form game and then computing a sub-game perfect Nash equilibrium requires exponential space and time. It is an open question whether a sub-game perfect Nash equilibrium or 7 We already know from Nash's original result that a mixed Nash equilibrium exists for any game.
for that matter any Nash equilibrium preference profile can be computed in polynomial time. We can prove the following theorem for the "threat profile" whose construction is shown in Algorithm 3. THEOREM 6.3. Under PS and for two agents, there exists a preference profile that is in DL-Nash equilibrium and results in the same assignment as the assignment based on the truthful preferences. Moreover, it can be computed in linear time.
PROOF. The proof is by induction over the length of the preference lists constructed. The main idea of the proof is that if both agents compete for the same house then they do not have an incentive to delay eating it. If the most preferred houses do not coincide, then both the agents get them with probability one but will not get them completely if they delay eating them.
Let the original preferences of agent 1 and agent 2 be represented by lists P 1 and P 2 . We present an algorithm to compute preferences Q 1 and Q 2 that are in DL-Nash equilibrium. Initialise Q 1 and Q 2 to empty lists. Now consider the maximal elements h from P 1 and h from P 2 . Element h is appended to the list Q 1 and h is appended to the list Q 2 . At the same time h is deleted from P 1 and h is deleted from P 2 . Now if h = h , then h is appended to Q 1 and h is appended to Q 2 . The process is repeated until Q 1 and Q 2 are complete lists and P 1 and P 2 are empty lists. The algorithm is described as Algorithm 3.
We now prove that P 1 is a DL best response against P 2 and P 2 is a DL best response against P 1 . The proof is by induction over the length of the preference lists. For the first elements in the preference lists P 1 and P 2 , if the elements coincide, then no agent has an incentive to put the element later in the list since the element is both agents' most preferred house. If the maximal elements do not coincide i.e. h = h , then 1 and 2 get h and h respectively with probability one. However they still need to express these houses as their most preferred houses because if they don't, they will not get the house with probability one. The reason is that h is the next most preferred house after h for agent 2 and h is the next most preferred house after h for agent 1. Agent 1 has no incentive to change the position of h since h is taken by agent 2 completely before agent 1 can eat it. Similarly, agent 2 has no incentive to change the position of h since h is taken by agent 1 completely before agent 2 can eat it. Now that the positions of h and h have been completely fixed, we do not need to consider them and we reason in the same manner over the updated lists P 1 and P 2 .
The desirable aspect of the threat profile is that since it results in the same assignment as the assignment based on the truthful preferences, the resultant assignment satisfies all the desirable properties of the PS outcome with respect to the original preferences. Due to Remark 5.5, we get the following corollary. COROLLARY 6.4. Under PS and for 2 agents, there exists a preference profile that is Nash equilibrium for any utilities consistent with the ordinal preferences. Moreover it can be computed in linear time.
In this next example, we show how Algorithm 3 is used to compute a preference profile that is in DL-Nash equilibrium. The example also shows that it can be the case that one preference profile is in DL-Nash equilibrium and the other is not, even if both profiles yield the same outcome.
Example 6.5 (Computing a threat profile).
1 : h 1 , h 2 , h 3 , h 4 2 : h 2 , h 3 , h 1 , h 4 We now use Algorithm 3 to compute a preference profile ( 1 , 2 ) that is in DLNash equilibrium: 1 = h 1 , h 2 , h 3 , h 4 and 2 = h 2 , h 1 , h 3 , h 4 . Note that P S( 1 , 2 ) = Technical Report: January 2014.
Input: ({1, 2}, H, ( 1, 2)) Output: The "threat profile" (Q1, Q2) where Qi is the preference list of agent i for i ∈ {1, 2}.
1 Let P i be the preference list of agent i ∈ {1, 2} 2 Initialise Q 1 and Q 2 to empty lists. 3 while P 1 and P 2 are not empty do 4
Let h = first(P 1 ) and h = first(P 2 ) 5 Append h to Q 1 ; Append h to Q 2 6
Delete h from P 1 ; Delete h from P 2 7 if h = h then 8 Append h to Q 1 ; Append h to Q 2 ; 9 end if 10 end while 11 return (Q 1 , Q 2 ).
Algorithm 3: Threat profile DL-Nash equilibrium for 2 agents (which also is an EU Nash equilibrium) 1 0 1/2 1/2 0 1 1/2 1/2
. Although P S( 1 , 2 ) = P S( 1 , 2 ), we see that ( 1 , 2 ) is in DLNash equilibrium but ( 1 , 2 ) is not! Next we show how our identified links with sequential allocation allocation of indivisible houses leads us to another Nash equilibrium profile called the crossout profile. The algorithm to compute the crossout profile is stated as Algorithm 4.
Input: ({1, 2}, H, ( 1, 2)) Output: The "crossout profile" (Q1, Q2) where Qi is the preference list of agent i for i ∈ {1, 2}.
1 Let P i be the order-preserving bisection of preference list of agent i ∈ {1, 2} 2 Initialise Q 1 and Q 2 to empty lists. 3 while P 1 and P 2 are not empty do 4
Let h = last(P 1 ); Prepend h to Q 2 ; Delete h from P 1 and P 2 ; 5 Let h = last(P 2 ); Prepend h to Q 1 ; Delete h from P 1 and P 2 ; 6 end while 7 extend Q 1 and Q 2 to have the consecutivity property but the same allocation. 8 change Q 1 and Q 2 via order-preserving join of Q 1 and Q 2 . 9 return (Q 1 , Q 2 ).
Algorithm 4: Crossover profile DL-Nash equilibrium for 2 agents (which also is an EU Nash equilibrium)
In Algorithm 4, the Nash equilibrium problem for PS is changed into the same problem for sequential allocation by changing each house into a half house. The idea behind the crossout profile for the sequential allocation setting is that no agent will choose the least preferred object unless it is the only object left. Thus agent 2 will be forced to get the least preferred object of agent 1 [ Levine and Stange 2012; Kohler and Chandrasekaran 1971] . In Algorithm 4, we use this idea recursively to build sequences of objects Q 1 and Q 2 for each agent that are allocated to them. If one agent gets a half house and the other agent gets the other half house, it can be proved that the positions of the half houses in Q 1 and Q 2 are same. This sequence of objects for each agent are then extended to preferences that give the same allocations under sequential allocation and which also satisfy the consecutivity property. The preferences for sequential allocation are then transformed via order-preserving join to obtain the crossover Nash equilibrium profile for the PS rule. By Lemma 5.4, the preference profile is in Nash equilibrium. Next we show that the threat profile and crossout profile are different and may also give different assignments.
Example 6.6 ( Crossout profile). Consider the following profile.
1 : h 1 , h 2 , h 3 , h 4 2 : h 2 , h 3 , h 1 , h 4 We now use Algorithm 4 to compute a preference profile ( 1 , 2 ) that is in DLNash equilibrium where 1 = h 2 , h 1 , h 4 , h 3 and 2 = h 2 , h 3 , h 4 , h 1 . Note that P S( 1 , 2 ) = 1 1/2 0 1/2 0 1/2 1 1/2 . The crossout Nash equilibrium profile is different from the threat Nash equilibrium profile for the problem instance.
The complexity of computing a Nash equilibrium profile for more than two agents still remains open. However we have presented a positive result for two agents -a case which captures various fair division scenarios.
EXPERIMENTS
In this section, we examine the likelihood that at least one agent would have an incentive to misreport his preferences to get more expected utility. To gain insight into this issue we have performed a series of experiments to determine the frequency that, for a given number of agents and houses, a profile will have a beneficial strategic reporting opportunity for a single agent.
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In order to preform this experiment we need to generate preferences and utilities for each of the agents. We consider two different models to generate profiles. (i) In the Impartial Culture (IC) model, the assumption is that for each agent and a given number of houses, each of the |H|! preference orders over the houses is equally likely ( 1 |H|! ). (ii) In the Uniform Single Peaked (USP), the assumption is that all single peaked preference profiles are equally likely. Single peaked preferences are a profile restriction introduced by Black [1948] and well studied in the social choice literature. Informally, in a single peaked profile, given all possible 3-sets of houses, no agent ever ranks some particular house last in all 3 sets that it appears.
In order to evaluate if an agent has a better response we need to assign utilities to the individual houses for each agent. While there are a number of ways to model utility we have selected the following mild restrictions on utilities in order to gain an understanding of the manipulation opportunities. (i) In the Random model, we uniformly at random generate a real number between 0 and 1 for each house that is compatible with the generated preference order. We normalize these utilities such that each agent's utility sums to a constant value that is the same for all agents. In our experiments each agent's utility sums to the number of houses in the instance. (ii) In the Borda model, we assign |H|−1 utility to the first house, |H|−2 to the second house, down to 0 utility for the least preferred house. (iii) In the Exponential (Exp) model, we assign utility 2 |H|−1 to the first house, 2 |H|−2 to the second house, down to 0 utility for the least preferred house.
We generated for each pair in |N | = {1, . . . , 8}×|H| = {1, . . . , 8} 1,000 profiles according to a utility and preference distribution. For each of these instances, we searched to see if any agent could get more utility by misreporting his preferences, if so, then we say that profile admitted a manipulation. Figure 2 show the percentage of instances that were manipulable for each of the domain, utility, number of agent, and number of house combinations (Borda is omitted for space).
Looking at Figure 2 , we observe that as the utility and preference models become more restrictive, the opportunities for a single agent to manipulate becomes smaller.
The Random-IC experiment yields the most frequently manipulable profiles, strictly dominating all the other runs of the experiment for every combination except one (Random-USP with 3 houses and 3 agents). Each experiment with single peaked preferences (save one) is dominated by the experiment with the unrestricted preference profiles for the same utility model. The PS rule is strategyproof with respect to the DL relation in the case where the number of agents and the number of houses are equal. Our experiment with the Exp model (which is similar to the DL relation but not exact) found no manipulable instances when the number of agents is less than or equal to the number of houses. It is encouraging that the manipulation opportunities for Exp-USP are so low. In this setting each agent is valuing the houses along the same axis of preference and prefers their first choice exponentially more than their second choice. As the number of houses relative to the number of agents grows, the opportunities to manipulate increase, maximizing around 99%.
CONCLUSIONS
We conducted a detailed computational analysis of strategic aspects of the PS rule. Our study leads to a number of new research directions. PS is well-defined even for indifferences [Katta and Sethuraman 2006] . It will be interesting to extend our results for strict preferences to the case with ties. Two interesting problems are still open. Firstly, What is the complexity of computing an expected utility best response for more than two agents? The problem is particularly intriguing because even for the related and conceptually simpler setting of discrete allocation, computing an expected utility best response for more than two agents has remained an open problem [Bouveret and Lang 2011] . Another problem is the complexity of computing a Nash equilibrium for more than two agents. It will also be interesting to examine coalitional manipulations and coalitional Nash equilibria. Finally, an analysis of Nash dynamics under the PS rule is an intriguing research problem.
A. PSEUDOCODE OF PS
We write the formal definition of PS from [Kojima 2009 ] as an algorithm. For any h ∈ H ⊂ H, let N (h, H ) = {i ∈ N : a i b for every b ∈ H } be the set of agents whose most preferred house in H is h. PS is defined as Algorithm 5. (N, H, ) Output: p the random assignment returned by PS 1 s ←− 0 (s is the stage of the algorithm) 2 
Input:
H O ←− H; t 0 ←− 0; p 0 ih ←− 0 for all i ∈ N and h ∈ H. 3 while H s = ∅ do 4 t s+1 (h) = sup{t ∈ [0, |H|] : i∈N p s ih + |N (h, H s )|(t − t s ) < 1} 5 t s+1 ←− min h∈H s t s (h) 6 H s = H s \ {h ∈ H s−1 : t(h) = t s } 7 for all i ∈ N and h ∈ H do 8 if i ∈ N (h, H s ) then 9 p s+1 ih ←− p s ih + t s+1 − t(
B. EXPECTED UTILITY BEST RESPONSE FOR THE ALTERNATION POLICY
In this section we recall the best response algorithm proposed in [Kohler and Chandrasekaran 1971] as we will use it to derive the best response algorithm for the PS algorithm.
We denote the algorithm from [Kohler and Chandrasekaran 1971] BESTEURESPONSEALGO. In particular, we describe BESTEURESPONSEALGO for the special case k i = 1 and n i = 2 so that we follow the alternation policy. We also assume that the number of houses is even as this is sufficient for our purposes. These restrictions simplify the algorithm.
Following Kohler and Chandrasekaran [Kohler and Chandrasekaran 1971] , we use a matrix V = V i,j , i = 1, 2, j = 1, . . . , m, where V i,j represents the utility value that the i-th player will gain if he selects the h j object. In our case, we assume that V i,j = u i,j , i = 1, 2, j = 1, . . . , m, such that u i,j ∈ R and u i,j > u i,j iff h j i h j . As 2 ranks houses h j , j = 1, . . . , m, lexicographically, we have V 2,j ≥ V 2,j+1 , j = 1, . . . , m − 1. Algorithm 6 shows a pseudocode for the simplified version of BESTEURESPONSEALGO.
We refer to J k as an ordered set formed at the kth stage of BESTEURESPONSEALGO.
The ordered set J m/2 is the optimal set of houses for agent 1 to choose, and agent 1 must choose them in the lexicographic order. We denote BESTEURESPONSE = BESTEURESPONSEALGO(V ). Note that the number of houses in BESTEURESPONSE is m/2.
Example B.1. Consider two agents with preferences 1 = h 5 , h 6 , h 1 , h 3 , h 4 , h 2 and 2 = h 1 , h 2 , h 3 , h 4 , h 5 , h 6 . First, we form a matrix V . We select arbitrary numbers u i,j that satisfy conditions above, e.g.
Input: (Vi,j, i = 1, 2, j = 1, . . . , m) Output: the set of houses allocated to agent 1 as a result of his best response.
Algorithm 6: BESTEURESPONSEALGO for sequential allocation for two agents V = 4 1 3 2 6 5 6 5 4 3 2 1
The following table shows an execution of the algorithm on this example over profiles 1 and 2 . Table I : An execution of BESTEURESPONSEALGO on Example B.1.
Given BESTEURESPONSE we define a profile that corresponds to the best response BEST
1
. By BESTEURESPONSE(i) we refer to the house at the ith position. First, we rank houses in BESTEURESPONSE in the same order as they occur in BESTEURESPONSE, so that BEST 1 = (BESTEURESPONSE(1), . . . , BESTEURESPONSE(m/2). Then, after BESTEURESPONSE(m/2), we rank houses that agent 2 gets in the same order as agent 2 obtains them. In Example B.1,
C. A BEST RESPONSE WITHOUT THE CONSECUTIVITY PROPERTY (EXAMPLE)
Next we provide an example that shows that a best response returned by Algorithm 6 over 
D. EXPECTED UTILITY BEST RESPONSE FOR THE PS MECHANISM (FULL PROOF).
In this section, we demonstrate that given we can always find the expected utility best response to CLONED 2 that has the consecutivity property. To do so, we first run BESTEURESPONSEALGO to obtain BESTEURESPONSE. Then we demonstrate that it can be modified and extended to a profile over H CLONED that has the consecutivity property.
Given BESTEURESPONSE, we denote the ordered set of houses allocated to agent j BEST-ALLOC j , j = 1, 2. Note that BEST-ALLOC 1 = BESTEURESPONSE. Then BEST-ALLOC 1 (i) and BEST-ALLOC 2 (i) are houses that are allocated to agent 1 and agent 2, respectively, in the ith round of the alternation policy. 2 . . . 2 h j ip }. We will say these houses are lexicographically ordered as agent 2 orders his houses w.r.t. the lexicographic order by our assumption in Section 5.1.
First, we give an overview of the construction. Our construction is motivated by an observation that if BEST-ALLOC 1 and BEST-ALLOC 2 have the consecutivity property and half houses are obtained by agent 1 and 2 at the same round then it is straightforward to extend BEST-ALLOC 1 to CLONED-BEST 1 over H CLONED that has the consecutivity property. Consider the following example. Based on this observation, the goal of the construction is to transform BEST-ALLOC 1 is such a way that half houses of h i that are allocated to different agents are allocated to them in the same round while preserving allocations of both agents. To do so, we prove that an allocation of half houses and full houses in an execution of BESTEURESPONSEALGO follows simple patterns. The first property concerns full houses : halves of full houses allocated to an agent are always allocated in consecutive rounds. The second key property concerns half houses. Let H Gj = {h j i1 , . . . , h j ip } be the lexicographically ordered set of half houses allocated to agent j, j = 1, 2. Then allocation of half houses obeys the following order: agent 1 gets h 1 i1 at round k t1 then, possibly in later round k t1 , agent 2 gets h 2 i1 . Next, agent 1 gets h 1 i2 at round k t2 then, possibly in later round k t2 , agent 2 gets h 2 i1 , and so on. In other words, half houses are allocated to agents in lexicographic order and each half houses is allocated to both agents before the next half houses is allocated. Based on these properties, we will prove that we can delay an allocation of h 1 i h to agent 1 till round k t h and preserve the allocations. We need to prove several useful properties of BESTEURESPONSE. The next proposition states that if only half of h i is allocated to agent 1(2) then this half is h Assume that the statement holds for i − 1 rounds. Consider the ith round. Suppose, by contradiction, h := BEST-ALLOC 1 (i) 2 BEST-ALLOC 2 (i) =: h and h and h are not halves of the same house. As h and h are allocated houses at the ith round then these houses are top preferences of agent 1 and agent 2, respectively, after i − 1th round. As h 2 h , there exists a round i < i such that h is the top preference of agent 2 at this round. Moreover, h is available to agent 2 at this round as agent 1 only requests it at the ith round. Hence, h will be allocated to agent 2 at the i th round. This contradicts the assumption that h is allocated to agent 1.
The next result is the key result the section on computing the best EU response. We consider half-houses G H1 = {h 
PROOF. By contradiction, suppose that h 1 t is the first half-house allocated to agent 1 that violates the statement so that k is the best response for 2 using PS. THEOREM D.13. For the case of two agents and the PS rule, a DL best response and an EU best response are equivalent.
PROOF. For two agents, PS assigns probabilities from the set {0, 1/2, 1}. Hence DL preferences can be represented by the EU preferences where the utility are exponential: the utility of a more preferred house is twice the utility of the next preferred house. Hence a response if a DL best response if it is an EU best response for exponential utilities. On the other we have shown that for two agents and the PS rule, an EU best response is the same for any utilities compatible with the preferences. Hence for two agents, an EU best response for any utilities is the same as the EU best response for exponential utilities which in turn is the same as a DL best response.
E. PROOF OF THEOREM ??
PROOF. Using a computer program we have found the following 15 step sequence which leads to a cycling of the preference profile. We use U to denote the matrix of Technical Report: January 2014. utilities of the agents over the items such that U [1][1] is the utility of agent 1 for house h 1 . We use P to represent the reported profile of each agent, P [i][j] denotes the jth most preferred house of agent i. Note that P starts as the truthful reporting in our example. We use P S [i] [j] to represent the fraction of house j that is eaten by agent i. We use EU [i] to be the expected utility of agent i. The initial preferences and utilities of the agents are 
In
Step 1, agent 3 changes his report and improves his utility. 
Step 2, agent 1 changes his report in response. 
Step 3, agent 3 again changes his report. 
Step 5, agent 3 reacts again. 
Step 6, agent 2 reacts.
P 6 = h 2 h 1 h 3 h 4 h 5 h 6 h 6 h 2 h 1 h 5 h 3 h 4 h 6 h 2 h 3 h 1 h 4 h 5 P S 6 = 1/2 2/3 1/4 1/2 1/12 0 1/2 1/6 0 0 5/6 1/2 0 1/6 3/4 1/2 1/12 1/2 EU 6 = 6.833 7.333 6.333
.
Step 7, agent 3 reacts.
Technical Report: January 2014.
P 7 = h 2 h 1 h 3 h 4 h 5 h 6 h 6 h 2 h 1 h 5 h 3 h 4 h 6 h 3 h 1 h 2 h 5 h 4 P S 7 = 1/2 3/4 1/8 5/8 0 0 1/2 1/4 0 3/16 9/16 1/2 0 0 7/8 3/16 7/16 1/2 EU 7 = 7.00 6.6875 6.8125 .
Step 8, agent 1 changes his report.
P 8 = h 2 h 3 h 1 h 4 h 5 h 6 h 6 h 2 h 1 h 5 h 3 h 4 h 6 h 3 h 1 h 2 h 5 h 4 P S 8 = 5/24 3/4 3/8 2/3 0 0 7/12 1/4 0 1/6 1/2 1/2 5/24 0 5/8 1/6 1/2 1/2 EU 8 = 7.2083 6.5833 6.0417 .
Step 9, agent 2 reacts. 
Step 10, agent 3 reacts again.
P 10 = h 2 h 3 h 1 h 4 h 5 h 6 h 6 h 2 h 5 h 1 h 3 h 4 h 3 h 1 h 2 h 5 h 4 h 6 P S 10 = 1/2 1 0 1/2 0 0 0 0 0 1/4 3/4 1 1/2 0 1 1/4 1/4 0 EU 10 = 7.5 8.25 6.25 .
Step 11, agent 2 reacts.
P 11 = h 2 h 3 h 1 h 4 h 5 h 6 h 5 h 2 h 3 h 6 h 1 h 4 h 3 h 1 h 2 h 5 h 4 h 6 P S 11 = 1/2 1 0 1/2 0 0 0 0 0 0 1 1 1/2 0 1 1/2 0 0 EU 11 = 7.5 9.0 6.0 .
Step 12, agent 3 reacts.
P 12 = h 2 h 3 h 1 h 4 h 5 h 6 h 5 h 2 h 3 h 6 h 1 h 4 h 3 h 2 h 5 h 6 h 1 h 4 P S 12 = 2/3 1 0 1/3 0 0 1/6 0 0 1/3 1 1/2 1/6 0 1 1/3 0 1/2 EU 12 = 7.6667 7.1667 7.3333 .
Step 13, agent 2 reacts.
P 13 = h 2 h 3 h 1 h 4 h 5 h 6 h 6 h 2 h 3 h 5 h 1 h 4 h 3 h 2 h 5 h 6 h 1 h 4 P S 13 = 2/3 1 0 1/3 0 0 1/6 0 0 1/3 1/2 1 1/6 0 1 1/3 1/2 0 EU 13 = 7.6667 7.6667 5.8333 .
Step 14, agent 3 reacts again. 
Step 15, agent 2 reacts once more to agent 3.
P 15 = h 2 h 3 h 1 h 4 h 5 h 6 h 5 h 2 h 3 h 6 h 1 h 4 h 3 h 1 h 2 h 5 h 4 h 6 P S 15 = 1/2 1 0 1/2 0 0 0 0 0 0 1 1 1/2 0 1 1/2 0 0 EU 15 = 7.5 9.0 6.0 . This last step is the same profile as step 11, which means we have cycled.
